I really like this perspective and will reread to internalize it more.
I'm curious though what you think of something like Dan Kahan's study about motivated reasoning: that people will reinterpret math facts to align with tribal norms, and this effect is stronger when people are better at math. That does seem to show that motivated reasoning supersedes "rationality" when identity is at stake even when the relevant facts are right in front of you.
Thanks Kevin. Those studies haven't replicated very well, although even if one takes them at face value, I don't think they're inconsistent with the constrained character of motivated cognition identified here. They would simply show that we're worse at reasoning when identity and motivations are in play, which is true, not that we can believe whatever we want.
Loved this post Dan. Alongside motivated cognition, people are uncomfortable in probabilistic thinking and scenarios. A lot of life is in the margins and there isn’t a definite “correct” answer most of the time.
“. . . highly selective, low-resolution compressions of reality.” Epistemological complexity might have another implication here, when truth requires not swapping out a false ‘fact’ for a true one, but coming up with a higher resolution model of reality that can reconcile both. Social reality in large, diverse societies may require models too complex for the average voter (or any individual) to hold.
Also, I’d add anger to your list of motivated-cognition responses to incompatible facts. It’s probably muted in academic contexts by norms of argument, but for most people there is some set of beliefs that is defended at a pre-conscious, emotional level before cognition has time to kick in.
Well, I do believe you’ve hit it out of the park yet once again with this essay. I have to go back through and also check the links, but based on my first read, I have a couple observations/questions:
First: A la George Orwell’s Newspeak, do I see implicit (or maybe explicit?) in your essay the use of obfuscation as a propagandist strategy to create the appearance of complexity and thereby make it virtually impossible to decipher the truth?
Second: Your essay brings to mind George Lakoff’s “worldview” hypothesis. Until very recently (you see how backward I am . . .) I was not aware of his work, but the “worldview” idea resonated. I am finding his level of abstraction a struggle, but here’s where I come out so far:
The family-role framings he used seemed out of date to me, so I challenged myself to re-describe them, using my mother (97-year-old, hard-scrabbling working class, lifelong conservative) and me (76-year old overeducated liberal/left) as “templates”:
Conservative=strong emphasis on self-reliance. This can extend beyond the immediate and extended family to the local community, including, eg, neighborhood, religious, and secular community groups.
Liberal=strong emphasis on interdependence, not only at an interpersonal, but also at a societal level.
With this exercise, I found it quite easy to see the coherence of her worldview, which I do not find at all irrational, even though I disagree.
OK, this is all probably once again way off target of the import of your essay. As always, thank you for pushing us all to think harder and better.
So I would say that some aspects of reality are epistemically complex, others less so. So we need to distinguish these. Instead of generalizing, maybe try a couple of real world examples.
Also, some people engage in motivated cognition to a great degree, others perhaps a little, and others less so. Again, generalizing casts everyone in the same hopeless light and supports views such as everyday people are unqualified to be involved in societal decisions.
Any discussion of finding truth must distinguish between beliefs and facts. Beliefs: "Washington was the greatest President" "To lie is wrong". Facts: "Water molecules contain hydrogen" "The red spot on a seagull's bill elicits pecking behavior from seagull chicks". Beliefs are neither true nor false; facts are. The scientific method is designed to ascertain the truth or falsity of facts and reduce or eliminate the cognitive deceptions you describe. There is no "scientific method" to ascertain whether beliefs are right or wrong, or good or bad.
We have beliefs about facts, which can be true or false. If you believe the capital of France is Berlin, you're wrong. Facts can't be true or false. Although the distinction you're drawing is widespread, it is incoherent.
From some perspective "facts" is another word for "context", neh? An object might look like a square to one person, or a triangle to another, depending on their vantage point. If they say "it's a triangle" or "it's a square" they are not as factual as "it looks like {X} from here"—but also maybe the implication of incorrectness is always present? Do scientists need to prefix or suffix their missives with "I think"?
It's funny that we've know of these behaviours for millenia but still fall for them. I guess it's sort of like optical illusions, where even knowing how things work only helps a little, as far as defense against illusion goes, so to speak.
(The answer for the question of "to qualify or not to qualify", I belive is "it depends"... but that's the answer to most everything, heh! (Ignore that I qualified that statement. =]))
In closing: one person could deduce that the object was a pyramid by "trusting" the two others with "conflicting" accounts + extrapolation/deduction, or else just being at a good vantage to see the sides (note that even with a perfect angle, you need mirrors or something to "see" all the sides— and even then they're just the outsides).
Apropos to nothing, trust is a very interesting concept in some (all?) scenarios!
I really like this perspective and will reread to internalize it more.
I'm curious though what you think of something like Dan Kahan's study about motivated reasoning: that people will reinterpret math facts to align with tribal norms, and this effect is stronger when people are better at math. That does seem to show that motivated reasoning supersedes "rationality" when identity is at stake even when the relevant facts are right in front of you.
Thanks Kevin. Those studies haven't replicated very well, although even if one takes them at face value, I don't think they're inconsistent with the constrained character of motivated cognition identified here. They would simply show that we're worse at reasoning when identity and motivations are in play, which is true, not that we can believe whatever we want.
Loved this post Dan. Alongside motivated cognition, people are uncomfortable in probabilistic thinking and scenarios. A lot of life is in the margins and there isn’t a definite “correct” answer most of the time.
“. . . highly selective, low-resolution compressions of reality.” Epistemological complexity might have another implication here, when truth requires not swapping out a false ‘fact’ for a true one, but coming up with a higher resolution model of reality that can reconcile both. Social reality in large, diverse societies may require models too complex for the average voter (or any individual) to hold.
Also, I’d add anger to your list of motivated-cognition responses to incompatible facts. It’s probably muted in academic contexts by norms of argument, but for most people there is some set of beliefs that is defended at a pre-conscious, emotional level before cognition has time to kick in.
Well, I do believe you’ve hit it out of the park yet once again with this essay. I have to go back through and also check the links, but based on my first read, I have a couple observations/questions:
First: A la George Orwell’s Newspeak, do I see implicit (or maybe explicit?) in your essay the use of obfuscation as a propagandist strategy to create the appearance of complexity and thereby make it virtually impossible to decipher the truth?
Second: Your essay brings to mind George Lakoff’s “worldview” hypothesis. Until very recently (you see how backward I am . . .) I was not aware of his work, but the “worldview” idea resonated. I am finding his level of abstraction a struggle, but here’s where I come out so far:
The family-role framings he used seemed out of date to me, so I challenged myself to re-describe them, using my mother (97-year-old, hard-scrabbling working class, lifelong conservative) and me (76-year old overeducated liberal/left) as “templates”:
Conservative=strong emphasis on self-reliance. This can extend beyond the immediate and extended family to the local community, including, eg, neighborhood, religious, and secular community groups.
Liberal=strong emphasis on interdependence, not only at an interpersonal, but also at a societal level.
With this exercise, I found it quite easy to see the coherence of her worldview, which I do not find at all irrational, even though I disagree.
OK, this is all probably once again way off target of the import of your essay. As always, thank you for pushing us all to think harder and better.
Unfortunately, generalizing often blurs reality.
So I would say that some aspects of reality are epistemically complex, others less so. So we need to distinguish these. Instead of generalizing, maybe try a couple of real world examples.
Also, some people engage in motivated cognition to a great degree, others perhaps a little, and others less so. Again, generalizing casts everyone in the same hopeless light and supports views such as everyday people are unqualified to be involved in societal decisions.
Language matters and influences our worldviews.
Any discussion of finding truth must distinguish between beliefs and facts. Beliefs: "Washington was the greatest President" "To lie is wrong". Facts: "Water molecules contain hydrogen" "The red spot on a seagull's bill elicits pecking behavior from seagull chicks". Beliefs are neither true nor false; facts are. The scientific method is designed to ascertain the truth or falsity of facts and reduce or eliminate the cognitive deceptions you describe. There is no "scientific method" to ascertain whether beliefs are right or wrong, or good or bad.
We have beliefs about facts, which can be true or false. If you believe the capital of France is Berlin, you're wrong. Facts can't be true or false. Although the distinction you're drawing is widespread, it is incoherent.
From some perspective "facts" is another word for "context", neh? An object might look like a square to one person, or a triangle to another, depending on their vantage point. If they say "it's a triangle" or "it's a square" they are not as factual as "it looks like {X} from here"—but also maybe the implication of incorrectness is always present? Do scientists need to prefix or suffix their missives with "I think"?
It's funny that we've know of these behaviours for millenia but still fall for them. I guess it's sort of like optical illusions, where even knowing how things work only helps a little, as far as defense against illusion goes, so to speak.
(The answer for the question of "to qualify or not to qualify", I belive is "it depends"... but that's the answer to most everything, heh! (Ignore that I qualified that statement. =]))
In closing: one person could deduce that the object was a pyramid by "trusting" the two others with "conflicting" accounts + extrapolation/deduction, or else just being at a good vantage to see the sides (note that even with a perfect angle, you need mirrors or something to "see" all the sides— and even then they're just the outsides).
Apropos to nothing, trust is a very interesting concept in some (all?) scenarios!