Great post. I think Dan is right to reject the constrained/tragic view of human knowledge. Humans are vastly ignorant of most things, but incremental epistemic gains are possible through better norms and institutions. Intellectual progress in science is a case in point. It would be great if we could create similar norms and institutions governing political discourse.
But I don’t share Dan’s embrace of the constrained/tragic view of morality, or not entirely. Just as human knowledge has progressed, so has morality — and not just through better institutions but also through changes in human psychology. Moral circles have expanded to encompass ethnic minorities and LGBTQ+ people. Integration into market economies has expanded interpersonal trust.
Human values and norms are extremely flexible (for better and for worse). I don’t doubt that humans will always be selfish, and there may well be limits to psychological moral progress. I’m not a utopian, but I don’t see any reason to think we’ve reached those limits already.
I went back through Dan's excellent essay and the helpful comment from Victor. I offer up these additional thoughts. Careful ongoing design of norms and institutions is essential because (i) human nature is constrained and (ii) we have learned that we need to constrain technology - otherwise we might exterminate the species or the planet (think nuclear weapons, climate change etc.). In fact, it raises this question: is this work so essential that it should become a necessary component of leadership in the 21st century? Current and future leaders have three choices when dealing with the wicked problems that arise from complex models of human cooperation: (i) retreat from public responsibility and hope things work out for the best, (ii) become a crony of those promoting existing practices, especially if change threatens your wealth and status, or (iii) put your resources behind policies and people seeking to improve the social order in a way that gives the greatest number the means and the hope for a better life.
I also agree with Victor's observation about the same line of thinking applying across settings, including politics. John Wooden, the ESPN Sports Coach of the 20th Century, was fond of saying that competition was a form of collaboration. Without competition, the true competitor - and the sport in general - would lack the information necessary for continuous improvement.
Quite similarly to how you are in favour of a "constrained vision of human altruism without thinking that humans are exclusively selfish", one could say you are in favour of a (but these are now my own words) "constrained vision of human knowledge without thinking that there's no hope, with the right incentives, of epistemic progress" --- except that if there is hope, then it's actually not correct, strictly speaking, to use the word "constrained". Only the moral vision is tragically constrained. The epistemic vision is not. I think that's indeed an important insight.
Notwithstanding this "strictly speaking", though, it remains the case that the correct perspective is very sympathetic to the "constrained" camp in both the moral and the epistemic case.
But then (finally coming to the point of my comment) it makes sense for there in politics to be on offer, as Sowell apparently claims but you deny, a typical leftist package deal combining the two different unconstrained perspectives. It's the package for stupid people! Or let's say, it attracts a kind of thinker who, even though perhaps highly academically educated, seriously and systematically misunderstands human nature and social dynamics.
So, how does Sowell's tragic understanding of human knowledge, which you criticize here, differ from Lippmann's pessimistic understanding of public opinion, which you have celebrated on this blog (https://www.conspicuouscognition.com/p/the-world-outside-and-the-pictures )? I haven't read Sowell, but I'm having trouble seeing much daylight between their pessimistic views of our ability to understand and manage society.
They’re very different. Sowell has a culturally conservative/Hayekian view of knowledge and reason - deeply suspicious of intellectuals, very deferential towards the knowledge and accumulated wisdom of ordinary people. Lippmann at least in 1922 is basically the reverse. He is very technocratic, favouring the expert knowledge of intellectuals, and pessimistic about ordinary “wisdom” and “experience”, at least as an input into political decision-making. It’s a bit more complicated than this because in some ways Lippmann came to adopt views that are quite Hayekian (and in fact anticipated Hayek’s arguments in some ways) but Public Opinion itself is the kind of text Sowell would hate, I think.
Excellent piece, Dan. I think you argued well for the compatibility of moral limitation and epistemic opportunity, but your final prescription—to accept some concept of moral limitation— was not accompanied by reasons for doing so. If anything, you paired it with a weak man, utopian vision of human nature. To be fair, you have made arguments elsewhere to this effect, but to earn such a prescription, I think you might consider putting the "grubby motivations" and "leverage-through-incentives" approach through its paces by placing it in contest with Amartya Sen's "capabilities approach." The specific thread I would pull (easily LLM accessible) is his "Plurality of Impartial Reasons" that connects Smithian Impartiality to the act of "Public Reasoning" and their anchoring in capabilities. I anticipate that if you steel man his line or reasoning, it will complicate your view of leverage through incentives— perhaps by contrasting capabilities as the more decentralizing lens, and incentives the more centralizing. From another angle, an incentives lens may perform quite well for post-hoc diagnoses, but there may be no reason to expect a symmetrical predictive power for use in any centralized design of institutions.
Also, you may have done Smith a disservice. His central thesis on moral sentiments (and even on the basis of economic function) was derived directly from social motivations:
"To deserve, to acquire, and to enjoy the respect and admiration of mankind, are the great objects of ambition and emulation. Two different roads are presented to us, equally leading to the attainment of this so much desired object; the one, by the study of wisdom and the practice of virtue; the other, by the acquisition of wealth and greatness."
His concept of "Impartiality" is also pragmatic and contrastive with naked self-interest rather than held as its negation or as some ideal proportionality.
It seems to me that a central theme of Sowell’s book is that there are no perfect solutions, only trade-offs. Dan does not address this directly. The unconstrained view tends to assume that wealth can be taken from productive, wealthy people and transferred to poorer people without weakening incentives, investment, or overall prosperity.
-Do you believe that all humans have roughly the same moral limitations: levels of self-interest, competitiveness...etc. Or do you believe there is variance among humans when it comes to these variables?
-If you believe there to be variance, what influences / impacts that variance? What factors are at play that drive variance in moral limitations, and can these factors be taken into consideration when designing systems / institutions / organizing structures?
-What is the range of that moral variance among humans? Is it very narrow or wide? (I understand the challenge of trying to describe relative range in something so abstract 😂)
-If humans are morally limited, as you argue, what is the moral ceiling that constrains the variance range, regardless of influencing external factors? Can that ceiling be understood and defined in some tangible way?
These are questions that emerge for me as I unpack how your theories on human nature can map into actual societal structures that maximize collective human and environmental flourishing, while considering practical constraints.
Great post. I think Dan is right to reject the constrained/tragic view of human knowledge. Humans are vastly ignorant of most things, but incremental epistemic gains are possible through better norms and institutions. Intellectual progress in science is a case in point. It would be great if we could create similar norms and institutions governing political discourse.
But I don’t share Dan’s embrace of the constrained/tragic view of morality, or not entirely. Just as human knowledge has progressed, so has morality — and not just through better institutions but also through changes in human psychology. Moral circles have expanded to encompass ethnic minorities and LGBTQ+ people. Integration into market economies has expanded interpersonal trust.
Human values and norms are extremely flexible (for better and for worse). I don’t doubt that humans will always be selfish, and there may well be limits to psychological moral progress. I’m not a utopian, but I don’t see any reason to think we’ve reached those limits already.
I agree with this - human nature is even slower to change than norms and institutions but we do gain greater insights over time.
I went back through Dan's excellent essay and the helpful comment from Victor. I offer up these additional thoughts. Careful ongoing design of norms and institutions is essential because (i) human nature is constrained and (ii) we have learned that we need to constrain technology - otherwise we might exterminate the species or the planet (think nuclear weapons, climate change etc.). In fact, it raises this question: is this work so essential that it should become a necessary component of leadership in the 21st century? Current and future leaders have three choices when dealing with the wicked problems that arise from complex models of human cooperation: (i) retreat from public responsibility and hope things work out for the best, (ii) become a crony of those promoting existing practices, especially if change threatens your wealth and status, or (iii) put your resources behind policies and people seeking to improve the social order in a way that gives the greatest number the means and the hope for a better life.
I also agree with Victor's observation about the same line of thinking applying across settings, including politics. John Wooden, the ESPN Sports Coach of the 20th Century, was fond of saying that competition was a form of collaboration. Without competition, the true competitor - and the sport in general - would lack the information necessary for continuous improvement.
Quite similarly to how you are in favour of a "constrained vision of human altruism without thinking that humans are exclusively selfish", one could say you are in favour of a (but these are now my own words) "constrained vision of human knowledge without thinking that there's no hope, with the right incentives, of epistemic progress" --- except that if there is hope, then it's actually not correct, strictly speaking, to use the word "constrained". Only the moral vision is tragically constrained. The epistemic vision is not. I think that's indeed an important insight.
Notwithstanding this "strictly speaking", though, it remains the case that the correct perspective is very sympathetic to the "constrained" camp in both the moral and the epistemic case.
But then (finally coming to the point of my comment) it makes sense for there in politics to be on offer, as Sowell apparently claims but you deny, a typical leftist package deal combining the two different unconstrained perspectives. It's the package for stupid people! Or let's say, it attracts a kind of thinker who, even though perhaps highly academically educated, seriously and systematically misunderstands human nature and social dynamics.
So, how does Sowell's tragic understanding of human knowledge, which you criticize here, differ from Lippmann's pessimistic understanding of public opinion, which you have celebrated on this blog (https://www.conspicuouscognition.com/p/the-world-outside-and-the-pictures )? I haven't read Sowell, but I'm having trouble seeing much daylight between their pessimistic views of our ability to understand and manage society.
They’re very different. Sowell has a culturally conservative/Hayekian view of knowledge and reason - deeply suspicious of intellectuals, very deferential towards the knowledge and accumulated wisdom of ordinary people. Lippmann at least in 1922 is basically the reverse. He is very technocratic, favouring the expert knowledge of intellectuals, and pessimistic about ordinary “wisdom” and “experience”, at least as an input into political decision-making. It’s a bit more complicated than this because in some ways Lippmann came to adopt views that are quite Hayekian (and in fact anticipated Hayek’s arguments in some ways) but Public Opinion itself is the kind of text Sowell would hate, I think.
Excellent piece, Dan. I think you argued well for the compatibility of moral limitation and epistemic opportunity, but your final prescription—to accept some concept of moral limitation— was not accompanied by reasons for doing so. If anything, you paired it with a weak man, utopian vision of human nature. To be fair, you have made arguments elsewhere to this effect, but to earn such a prescription, I think you might consider putting the "grubby motivations" and "leverage-through-incentives" approach through its paces by placing it in contest with Amartya Sen's "capabilities approach." The specific thread I would pull (easily LLM accessible) is his "Plurality of Impartial Reasons" that connects Smithian Impartiality to the act of "Public Reasoning" and their anchoring in capabilities. I anticipate that if you steel man his line or reasoning, it will complicate your view of leverage through incentives— perhaps by contrasting capabilities as the more decentralizing lens, and incentives the more centralizing. From another angle, an incentives lens may perform quite well for post-hoc diagnoses, but there may be no reason to expect a symmetrical predictive power for use in any centralized design of institutions.
Also, you may have done Smith a disservice. His central thesis on moral sentiments (and even on the basis of economic function) was derived directly from social motivations:
"To deserve, to acquire, and to enjoy the respect and admiration of mankind, are the great objects of ambition and emulation. Two different roads are presented to us, equally leading to the attainment of this so much desired object; the one, by the study of wisdom and the practice of virtue; the other, by the acquisition of wealth and greatness."
His concept of "Impartiality" is also pragmatic and contrastive with naked self-interest rather than held as its negation or as some ideal proportionality.
It seems to me that a central theme of Sowell’s book is that there are no perfect solutions, only trade-offs. Dan does not address this directly. The unconstrained view tends to assume that wealth can be taken from productive, wealthy people and transferred to poorer people without weakening incentives, investment, or overall prosperity.
Thank you for sharing, Dan.
Some questions I'd love to hear your thoughts on:
-Do you believe that all humans have roughly the same moral limitations: levels of self-interest, competitiveness...etc. Or do you believe there is variance among humans when it comes to these variables?
-If you believe there to be variance, what influences / impacts that variance? What factors are at play that drive variance in moral limitations, and can these factors be taken into consideration when designing systems / institutions / organizing structures?
-What is the range of that moral variance among humans? Is it very narrow or wide? (I understand the challenge of trying to describe relative range in something so abstract 😂)
-If humans are morally limited, as you argue, what is the moral ceiling that constrains the variance range, regardless of influencing external factors? Can that ceiling be understood and defined in some tangible way?
These are questions that emerge for me as I unpack how your theories on human nature can map into actual societal structures that maximize collective human and environmental flourishing, while considering practical constraints.