Have we evolved to love our ingroup? Did our ancestors go through an evolutionary process of self-domestication? Is the occasional genocide just an unfortunate by-product of how friendly we are?
Fascinating and unsettling. That most of us are psychopaths when it comes to factory farming and the meat we eat and milk we drink is a thought I was recently reminded of reading an interview of a sociopath discussing her new book in the New York Times.
I do wonder about the social impact of this “uncomfortable knowledge” that you present. What, for example, would happen to trust levels in Norway and Sweden if this view of human nature were widely acknowledged? Are there better and worse ways to frame it? What does this mean for the power of ideas like egalitarianism, democracy and the expanding moral circle?
I suppose as always we must be vigilant to the appeal to nature when it comes to how ideas of this sort are deployed in the field of politics and relationships.
These are really good questions and I'm going to (try to) address them in my book. I think this view of human nature needn't undermine trust; rather, it tells us when trust is likely to be rational. But you're right that it's a complex and delicate issue.
I don’t doubt Hare & Woods argument is flawed in the ways you describe, but I don’t think that’s enough to support your “bottom line” that human cooperation is not illuminated by analogy with the process of domestication. Wrangham’s argument is that “Reduced reactive aggression must feature alongside intelligence, cooperation, and social learning as a key contributor to the emergence and success of our species. Docility should be considered as foundational of humankind, not just because it is unusual, but because it seems likely to be a vital precondition for advanced cooperation and social learning” (124). His argument strikes me as broadly persuasive and does not seem subject to the criticisms you make of Hare & Woods.
I agree that's a very different story and I much prefer Wrangham's take. However I still disagree with it - will have an essay on this later in the year
Good points, Dan. The cultural group selection people, on the other hand, argue that groups are hard pressed to develop mechanisms to ward off free riders and strenghten the degree of (irreversible) commitment, including initiation rites, sacrifices, language and skin marks. I am just remembering one major argument off the top of my head; it is possible there are others I cannot recall right now. I am a consumer of evolutionary thinking (I research what I call complex social problems, such as corruption, so I need to understand human sense making and behavior) and I can see how solid your arguments are. I think, however, they are not incompatible with the thinking of the GS crowd. Another author that goes a long way in exploring the reach of GS is Peter Turchin, applying it in broader terms to historical processes and phenomena, such as war. Thanks for your reply, I am learning a lot.
This is an excellent piece dissecting the intrincacies behind the human prosocial motive. I wonder, on the other hand, why you dismiss group selection. If we adopt the premise (and you may well disregard it or deny the separate status of this argument within the framework you´ve assembled) that there are collective entitites whose interests (mainly survival, replication, and growth) may well be in opposition to Darwinian drives at the individual level - think of the Catholic Church as one of the most extreme examples - why can´t we add group selection as a complimentary driver in the evolution of the prosocial motive? You may argue that in some cases (e.g., a religious extremist who is willing to sacrifice his life to gain prestige to himself or his family or secure financial gains to offspring) adding this driver is not parsimonious, but can we deny that groups whose interests are fully amalgamated with their members´ identities gain a foothold in the Darwinian-like competition for resources (broadly speaking) they engage in? I like Keith Stanovich´s work ("Robot´s Rebellion" condenses his arguments on this subject) and the work from researchers on cultural group selection (Kevin Laland and others), which I cannot summarize here for lack of space and time, but above all, I am very curious on the reasons why you dismiss group selection. Anyway, again, what a great piece you wrote!
Thanks Hamilton. This is a very good question. I don't have an in-principle objection to group selection. I've just never found it very plausible as an explanation of human behaviour and institutions. I'm inclined to think there aren't "collective entities" with interests. There are individual people with interests, who - under specific circumstances - give rise to groups and institutions, but these groups and institutions aren't usefully understood as agent-like systems in their own right. The Catholic Church is a good example here. I think its behaviour makes much better sense in terms of individuals pursuing their own interests.
"Can we deny that groups whose interests are fully amalgamated with their members' identities gain a foothold in the Darwinian-like competition for resources...?" But I think the problem is that you never get groups whose interests are fully amalgamated, and that to the extent that individuals place a group's interests above their own, the groups will be vulnerable to invasion by individuals who reap the benefits of others' altruism without making sacrifices themselves.
On cultural group selection, I'm again inclined to think that processes attributed to cultural group selection are better understood in terms of individuals pursuing their own interests. I think this paper is good here: https://ecoevorxiv.org/repository/view/6303/
However, it's a really good objection you raise and I need to think more about it. Thanks for reading!
Will the book explore the possible role of the decline in religion (which in many ways supports an anti-utopian, overly benign view of one's own inclinations) in resistance to the Constrained Vision?
I agree with the Constrained Vision, but I think that in terms of "what people think" we more often see conflicts when none or less is possible. There are an enormous range of win-win arrangements of societies that we fail to take advantage of because we think of things as zero sum, immigration and climate change being the primary US examples.
Yes very good point. People definitely seem biased towards zero sum thinking. Maybe such thinking was more often justified in ancestral conditions where there was no real economic growth?
An interesting essay. But surely Rousseau (utopian) and Hobbes (cynical/pessimistic) should both have got a mention? These two philosophical 'greats' have framed this discussion for centuries past.
Yes agree - will be writing more about that disagreement in the future. I think their views are both very mistaken and at odds with a modern scientific understanding of human nature and sociality.
Yes...although my tendencies are more Hobbesian than Rousseau I nevertheless agree with you. And look forward to your next essay on this. Meanwhile here is one of my own: 'Are We Making Progress?' https://grahamcunningham.substack.com/p/are-we-making-progress.....which is in part a critique of Steven Pinker's 'Better Angels of Our Nature' (although I do have a lot of time for Pinker's wider contributions to social psychology)
But the tragic vision could well grant that we are strategic collaborator, promoting our interests; but, she would argue that, dominant among these interests are friendliness.
Good point. In my view we don't assign intrinsic value to friendliness as an end in itself, or if we do it's a very weak value when compared to other fundamental goals we have (e.g. status, resources, sex, safety, etc).
Curious if you're familiar with Athena Aktipis's interdisciplinary work on cooperation drawing on cellular biology which looks very intriguing, as detailed here:
Now very curious for your take on Richard Wrangham's "The Goodness Paradox", which was to me a far more persuasive (and far darker) presentation of the human self-domestication thesis.
I'll look forward to reading that! After having read it, it seems fairly intuitive, given the expanding capacities for cooperation in our lineage, that coalitions of males would eliminate the most domineering and violent would-be alphas in their midst, thereby leading to selection against that sort of domineering violence. Even if that's true, however, I suppose it's another question entirely whether that rises to the level of "self-domestication" and to what extent it was a decisive factor in the origin of our species' idiosyncrasies. I'll look forward to you setting me straight on these matters ;)
I share your interest in the understanding of social behaviors, community building and cooperation, and how Darwinian "theory" (for the lack of a better word) influences these dynamics.
I'm currently re-reading Robert Wright's seminal "Moral Animal" (1996) to regain "a perspective on how evolution worked through Darwin's eyes, and how it translates to us as a "higher" order species. I intend to compare/contrast it to "The Survival of the Friendliest" for parallels, conflicts, etc.
Your review has given me a foundation upon which to make this comparison. Well done. -- Jim
You mention multilevel selection (also known as group selection) in a footnote. This is unlikely if one assumes that modern humans are the product of only biological evolution. If one considers cultural as well as biological evolution, then group selection can happen easily. This is because cultural transmission is much faster. An adaptive cultural element that appears in a group can spread throughout the group in a single generation. Hence a group in which an individual creates a good idea can all gain this new idea and use it to outcompete other groups who don't have it. Cultural evolution can operate via group selection.
In contrast, an adaptive gene mutation will take many generations to "take over" the group. During this time the better gene can spread to other groups as that no group can gain an advantage over another due to genetic evolution.
Thus, genetic evolution generation operates through individuals while its cultural cousin can operation through groups and individuals (and so be multilevel).
Fascinating and unsettling. That most of us are psychopaths when it comes to factory farming and the meat we eat and milk we drink is a thought I was recently reminded of reading an interview of a sociopath discussing her new book in the New York Times.
I do wonder about the social impact of this “uncomfortable knowledge” that you present. What, for example, would happen to trust levels in Norway and Sweden if this view of human nature were widely acknowledged? Are there better and worse ways to frame it? What does this mean for the power of ideas like egalitarianism, democracy and the expanding moral circle?
I suppose as always we must be vigilant to the appeal to nature when it comes to how ideas of this sort are deployed in the field of politics and relationships.
These are really good questions and I'm going to (try to) address them in my book. I think this view of human nature needn't undermine trust; rather, it tells us when trust is likely to be rational. But you're right that it's a complex and delicate issue.
I don’t doubt Hare & Woods argument is flawed in the ways you describe, but I don’t think that’s enough to support your “bottom line” that human cooperation is not illuminated by analogy with the process of domestication. Wrangham’s argument is that “Reduced reactive aggression must feature alongside intelligence, cooperation, and social learning as a key contributor to the emergence and success of our species. Docility should be considered as foundational of humankind, not just because it is unusual, but because it seems likely to be a vital precondition for advanced cooperation and social learning” (124). His argument strikes me as broadly persuasive and does not seem subject to the criticisms you make of Hare & Woods.
I agree that's a very different story and I much prefer Wrangham's take. However I still disagree with it - will have an essay on this later in the year
I'll look forward to reading it
Good points, Dan. The cultural group selection people, on the other hand, argue that groups are hard pressed to develop mechanisms to ward off free riders and strenghten the degree of (irreversible) commitment, including initiation rites, sacrifices, language and skin marks. I am just remembering one major argument off the top of my head; it is possible there are others I cannot recall right now. I am a consumer of evolutionary thinking (I research what I call complex social problems, such as corruption, so I need to understand human sense making and behavior) and I can see how solid your arguments are. I think, however, they are not incompatible with the thinking of the GS crowd. Another author that goes a long way in exploring the reach of GS is Peter Turchin, applying it in broader terms to historical processes and phenomena, such as war. Thanks for your reply, I am learning a lot.
Thanks Hamilton - will think more about these issues and check out Turchin's work (I have kept meaning to).
This is an excellent piece dissecting the intrincacies behind the human prosocial motive. I wonder, on the other hand, why you dismiss group selection. If we adopt the premise (and you may well disregard it or deny the separate status of this argument within the framework you´ve assembled) that there are collective entitites whose interests (mainly survival, replication, and growth) may well be in opposition to Darwinian drives at the individual level - think of the Catholic Church as one of the most extreme examples - why can´t we add group selection as a complimentary driver in the evolution of the prosocial motive? You may argue that in some cases (e.g., a religious extremist who is willing to sacrifice his life to gain prestige to himself or his family or secure financial gains to offspring) adding this driver is not parsimonious, but can we deny that groups whose interests are fully amalgamated with their members´ identities gain a foothold in the Darwinian-like competition for resources (broadly speaking) they engage in? I like Keith Stanovich´s work ("Robot´s Rebellion" condenses his arguments on this subject) and the work from researchers on cultural group selection (Kevin Laland and others), which I cannot summarize here for lack of space and time, but above all, I am very curious on the reasons why you dismiss group selection. Anyway, again, what a great piece you wrote!
Thanks Hamilton. This is a very good question. I don't have an in-principle objection to group selection. I've just never found it very plausible as an explanation of human behaviour and institutions. I'm inclined to think there aren't "collective entities" with interests. There are individual people with interests, who - under specific circumstances - give rise to groups and institutions, but these groups and institutions aren't usefully understood as agent-like systems in their own right. The Catholic Church is a good example here. I think its behaviour makes much better sense in terms of individuals pursuing their own interests.
"Can we deny that groups whose interests are fully amalgamated with their members' identities gain a foothold in the Darwinian-like competition for resources...?" But I think the problem is that you never get groups whose interests are fully amalgamated, and that to the extent that individuals place a group's interests above their own, the groups will be vulnerable to invasion by individuals who reap the benefits of others' altruism without making sacrifices themselves.
On cultural group selection, I'm again inclined to think that processes attributed to cultural group selection are better understood in terms of individuals pursuing their own interests. I think this paper is good here: https://ecoevorxiv.org/repository/view/6303/
However, it's a really good objection you raise and I need to think more about it. Thanks for reading!
Will the book explore the possible role of the decline in religion (which in many ways supports an anti-utopian, overly benign view of one's own inclinations) in resistance to the Constrained Vision?
Yes - a very interesting and important topic.
Of course religions have also encouraged plenty of self righteousness, too. :)
I agree with the Constrained Vision, but I think that in terms of "what people think" we more often see conflicts when none or less is possible. There are an enormous range of win-win arrangements of societies that we fail to take advantage of because we think of things as zero sum, immigration and climate change being the primary US examples.
Yes very good point. People definitely seem biased towards zero sum thinking. Maybe such thinking was more often justified in ancestral conditions where there was no real economic growth?
Absolutely. Zero growth from zero technical change also justifies zero interest on loans as the Jewish and Muslim traditions prescribe
An interesting essay. But surely Rousseau (utopian) and Hobbes (cynical/pessimistic) should both have got a mention? These two philosophical 'greats' have framed this discussion for centuries past.
Yes agree - will be writing more about that disagreement in the future. I think their views are both very mistaken and at odds with a modern scientific understanding of human nature and sociality.
Yes...although my tendencies are more Hobbesian than Rousseau I nevertheless agree with you. And look forward to your next essay on this. Meanwhile here is one of my own: 'Are We Making Progress?' https://grahamcunningham.substack.com/p/are-we-making-progress.....which is in part a critique of Steven Pinker's 'Better Angels of Our Nature' (although I do have a lot of time for Pinker's wider contributions to social psychology)
But the tragic vision could well grant that we are strategic collaborator, promoting our interests; but, she would argue that, dominant among these interests are friendliness.
Good point. In my view we don't assign intrinsic value to friendliness as an end in itself, or if we do it's a very weak value when compared to other fundamental goals we have (e.g. status, resources, sex, safety, etc).
Curious if you're familiar with Athena Aktipis's interdisciplinary work on cooperation drawing on cellular biology which looks very intriguing, as detailed here:
https://www.athenaaktipis.org/ https://www.aktipislab.org/
Similarly over-optimistic like Hare and Woods? She seems to draw on a broader palette.
I'm a fan of her work although don't know it in great depth.
Now very curious for your take on Richard Wrangham's "The Goodness Paradox", which was to me a far more persuasive (and far darker) presentation of the human self-domestication thesis.
I like the book but don't buy the central argument. I'm going to be publishing a piece on that and Boehm's "Moral Origins" at some point.
I'll look forward to reading that! After having read it, it seems fairly intuitive, given the expanding capacities for cooperation in our lineage, that coalitions of males would eliminate the most domineering and violent would-be alphas in their midst, thereby leading to selection against that sort of domineering violence. Even if that's true, however, I suppose it's another question entirely whether that rises to the level of "self-domestication" and to what extent it was a decisive factor in the origin of our species' idiosyncrasies. I'll look forward to you setting me straight on these matters ;)
A very thorough and insightful analysis, Dan.
I share your interest in the understanding of social behaviors, community building and cooperation, and how Darwinian "theory" (for the lack of a better word) influences these dynamics.
I'm currently re-reading Robert Wright's seminal "Moral Animal" (1996) to regain "a perspective on how evolution worked through Darwin's eyes, and how it translates to us as a "higher" order species. I intend to compare/contrast it to "The Survival of the Friendliest" for parallels, conflicts, etc.
Your review has given me a foundation upon which to make this comparison. Well done. -- Jim
Thanks Jim. I like Wright's book a lot - it holds up as an excellent overview of evolutionary psych.
Thanks. Interesting. I look forward to reading your book. All the best, John.
Thanks John - glad you enjoyed it
Well . . .
This string of assumptions, this analysis of human nature, seems just a secular version of ancient biblical wisdom.
Paul, an educated lawyer, provided this explanation . . .
“For we know that the Law is spiritual, but I am fleshly, sold under sin.
For I do not understand what I am doing. For I do not practice what I wish, but I do what I hate.
However, if I do what I do not wish, I agree that the Law is fine.
But now I am no longer the one doing it, but it is the sin that resides in me.
For I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, there dwells nothing good; for I have the desire to do what is fine but not the ability to carry it out.
For I do not do the good that I wish, but the bad that I do not wish is what I practice.
If, then, I do what I do not wish, I am no longer the one carrying it out, but it is the sin dwelling in me.’’
This insight holds up well, even after centuries.
Thanks
Clay
Dan has excellent pieces but all those links and books make you feel lost
Add The Moral Sense by James Q. Wilson to your booklist.
You mention multilevel selection (also known as group selection) in a footnote. This is unlikely if one assumes that modern humans are the product of only biological evolution. If one considers cultural as well as biological evolution, then group selection can happen easily. This is because cultural transmission is much faster. An adaptive cultural element that appears in a group can spread throughout the group in a single generation. Hence a group in which an individual creates a good idea can all gain this new idea and use it to outcompete other groups who don't have it. Cultural evolution can operate via group selection.
In contrast, an adaptive gene mutation will take many generations to "take over" the group. During this time the better gene can spread to other groups as that no group can gain an advantage over another due to genetic evolution.
Thus, genetic evolution generation operates through individuals while its cultural cousin can operation through groups and individuals (and so be multilevel).